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C O P Y

February 27, 1954

Dear Frank:

The following is an attempt to get somewhat more specific regarding the post-Berlin discussion we had on Friday.

I use as my basing point my memorandum of February 22 to the President, wherein I attempted to spell out what I believe we discovered in Berlin with respect to Soviet foreign policy intentions for the immediate future.

In that memorandum, I concluded that we now have a sizeable period of time -- at least a year -- in which to step up the general tempo of our cold war activities and indulge in pin-point harassment of vulnerable spots.

1954 is a year when the chances of "provoking" the Soviets into a major military reaction are as low as they have ever been since the war.

If this thesis is acceptable as general policy, then what is needed is a series of action decisions on the known Soviet soft spots.

To get the thinking started, here is a brief list of targets which I feel are vulnerable.

1. Berlin
2. East Germany
3. Widespread passive resistance in European satellites.
4. Stepped-up encouragement of defection by Soviet military and Soviet officials.
5. Preparing criminal indictment brief for use in Geneva to prove that the Chinese People's Republic is not the voice of the Chinese people, but is the product of an incredible conspiracy dating back to 1919-20. (I understand on the authority of OCB's Roy McNair that the complete documentation on this exists here in Washington.)

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6. Detachment of Country ...

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1. BERLIN

U.S. stock was never higher in Berlin, despite the failure of the Conference as far as Germany was concerned. The Socialist papers will have to make political opposition noises, and there will be silly Ollenhaut speeches, and Communist-inspired demonstrations in the Soviet Sector. But underneath any or all of this lies a solid concrete base of understanding, courage, and hope.

There is at least one big thing that could be done in Berlin which might have tremendous impact, and that is the announcement of a plan to erect the first atomic power reactor under the Eisenhower proposal in Berlin.

There are very practical as well as propaganda reasons for doing this. Every ounce of fuel, liquid or solid, used in Berlin has to be brought in to the city across Soviet territory. In spite of the reserve stocks we have accumulated, a new blockade would be very serious, particularly as the Soviet rail and canal Berlin by-passes now make it impossible for us to impose a counter-blockade.

An atomic power plant would be completely independent of any kind of emergency "lift" into Berlin, and while the first installation might not be able to supply one hundred percent enough power for normal peak loads, it would be able to supply the basic minimum needed to take care of the city under siege conditions. The propaganda aspects vis-a-vis the Germans and the Soviets are obvious.

There is nothing in the President's proposal nor in the talks between the Secretary and Molotov in Berlin, nor the upcoming talks with Khrushchev in Washington on the President's proposal, to interfere with our taking unilateral action. As a matter of fact, such action might speed Soviet acceptance of the President's proposal.

Someone will be sure to raise the objection that this puts fissionable material and/or atomic secrets into the very hands of the Russians. The answer to that is that a quick check with Lewis Strauss will give you the answer on the negligible amount of "material" needed. Furthermore, the kind of material to be used is not "bomb" type. And finally, there is no military secret involved in a power reactor.

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I have talked to Ambassador Conant about this idea, and he is extremely enthusiastic -- so much so that just before I left Berlin he wrote me a letter on the subject which I have given to Lewis Strauss so that if the project is to be carried further it can be directly between Strauss and Conant without going through the extra and unnecessary Jackson loop.

I would like to point out that to get impact from this idea, it is not necessary for the U.S. to make the final decision as to the actual erection of the power plant. The idea could be leaked simply as an idea. A survey group could wander around Berlin looking for a suitable site; a rubble area could be fenced off and put under guard with mysterious signs; and the project for the time being could be limited to the rumor stage, which from the standpoint of the Berliners and the Soviet observer is almost as good as actual getting on with the work.

Besides this big thing, there are a lot of smaller things that can be done.

The Tripartite communique issued after we left Berlin stated that we would concern ourselves immediately with all the different ways in which the life of the Berliners might be ameliorated.

This must not be allowed to drop into the limbo of endless meetings of the Western High Commissioners with no action emerging. The minimum called for is at least some symbolic evidence of activity on our part. In this work, as you know, the emotional and psychological impact of a small and relatively unimportant piece of action is as great, and frequently greater, than a vague realization that something tremendous is being cooked up behind closed doors which might be unveiled months hence.

Ambassador Conant, who is very receptive, should be instructed to get going on the implementation of the Tripartite communique with respect to Berlin as fast as possible, and he should be told not to allow himself or the British and French High Commissioners to get bogged down in interminable hassling over big projects while passing over all the small ones that could be decided upon and put into operation quickly.

The language of the communique states that the three Western High Commissioners will study this problem and then make their recommendations to the Soviet High Commissioner for Quadripartite approval. Obviously we are not going to get Soviet approval on very much.

The Soviet veto should be used by us as a weapon, by making sure that the inhabitants of Berlin know at all times what we want to do, and then let them be aware of the Soviet "veto". For purposes of sustained impact.

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it would be better to dribble out these proposals one by one over the coming days and weeks rather than take a lot of time until we have one great big beautiful package for the Soviets to turn down.

2. EAST GERMANY.

Through the use of leafleting and radio work over RIAS, and a continuation of the "W" campaign, the themes of German unification and free elections should be kept alive -- subtle hints that the amelioration of their conditions will come much more from their own pressure than from anything that can be done in the immediate future through diplomatic channels.

Volksplatz deflection should be stimulated as much as possible (in 1950, 2500 Vopos defected in Berlin alone, and not just as an aftermath of the June riots. The figures for the month of June were hardly any bigger than for the other months.)

We should be ever alert for opportunities to use food, which should be stored in Germany in advance and not require an act of Congress once a decision is made to go ahead.

Adequate infiltration and organization of factory cells should be undertaken immediately as a major project, with the idea of spreading a series of flash strikes and demonstrations in separated areas over an extended period of time -- the same technique that the Commies have from time to time used in France and Italy.

Sabotage of industrial and agricultural shipments out of the East Zone destined for Russia should be organized and undertaken on a major scale.

Clandestine terroristic pressure should be organized against the members of the Soviet regime in East Germany, and if an Ulbricht or two didn't show up at the office some morning, few would weep.

3. WIDESPREAD PASSIVE RESISTANCE IN EUROPEAN SATELLITES.

Here the treatment should be similar to the treatment under (2) above, but on a selective basis, depending upon the special vulnerability of a particular country. Possibly Czechoslovakia should be singled out.

As far as the satellites are concerned, if our measures produce Soviet military occupation of these countries, that fact should not be viewed

But in terms of the results of the meeting and subsequent relations which we have with the Germans in A. Germany

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with the alarm that was evident in the summer of 1953. Such action by the Soviets would merely confirm the ruthless military imperialism that they put into words in Berlin, and could be turned to our advantage.

4. STEPPED UP ENCOURAGEMENT OF DEFECTION BY SOVIET
MILITARY AND SOVIET OFFICIALS.

Self-evident.

5. CRIMINAL INDICTMENT RE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

Self-evident.

6. DETACHMENT OF COUNTRY X.

This will have special treatment outside this memorandum.

C. D. Jackson

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C. D. Jackson

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